The Bargaining Model Of War & Its Application

War has always been costly throughout human history, from the undoubtedly countless lives it takes or destroys (both civilian and military) to the enormous strain it almost certainly puts on the national economy as well as coffers. But, the advent of technological advances in warfare throughout the 19th-20th centuries has increased the speed, range, accuracy, and, most of all, destructiveness associated with conflict. It would seem then that wars have a central contradiction as they supposedly solve disputes over items of value, but, at the same time, ruin objects of significance. Political science professor, as well as author, James D. Fearon, has established a theory to explain why states fail to bargain and diplomatically resolve an issue given that war is a catastrophic alternative. Despite however influential this bargaining model of war might be to the academia of international relations, its fundamental assumptions hinder its capability to provide a complete and convincing account of the origins wars have had throughout history.

First, the parameters set by this theory must be defined before Fearon's explanations for physical conflict between states can be applied to any particular war. The major presuppositions of the bargaining model are that states act unitarily (meaning there is absolutely no opposition or rivalry for control within a state), that states effectively as well as consistently perform cost/benefit analyses, and that states would never wage war solely for war's sake. From these prerequisites all states possess, according to Fearon's theory, there are just three reasons as to why bargaining between parties will fail and devolve to war: the inability to share disputed items, a lack of commitment, or an overestimation of one's forces. Indivisibility occurs when the value of an object is diminished from partitioning it among states, but war can theoretically be avoided through side payments, concessions of other types, or even taking turns supposedly. The second possibility for conflict can be further broken down into two different factors; these nations have the incentive to strike due to offensive military doctrine or that surprise attacks are feasible. Alternatively, leaders fear that their opponents will not only grow stronger from a deal, but violate it in the future because of their new capabilities. The latter of the three explanations arises when excessively optimistic leaders receive private information that would lead towards victory, which gives reason to lie and misrepresent details in order to preserve an advantage.

Now, with necessary background knowledge of the bargaining model in mind, let us gauge how well accurate and persuasive Fearon's theory is when applied to the War of Austrian Succession: a conflict that cemented the rise of Prussia on the global stage as well as sanctioned royal inheritance by a woman. Shortly before this war had broken out, the Austrian emperor, Charles VI, had suffered a crippling defeat by the hands of their French and Spanish rivals, losing the claim to south Italy as well as the Duchy of Lorraine. To make matters worse, the Austrian throne was at risk as well as Charles VI had no suitable male heir and was reaching the end of his life; he did have two daughters, but female rule was incredibly taboo during this time. When the emperor passed away in October of 1740, his fears of succession crisis came to fruition as rival states within the Holy Roman Empire immediately denounced his newly initiated daughter, Marie Theresa. Furthermore, by Christmas of the same year, Austria's growing rival and competitor for hegemony in the German region, Prussia, had invaded as well as integrated the rich province of Silesia. On top of that, France and Spain were seeking to pursue territorial gains once again at the sight of Austria becoming weakened, so Austrian Netherlands, as well as northern Italian lands under Marie Theresa's control, became targets to the great powers of Europe. Despite these grim odds, the empresses consolidated her domestic power, raising a 20 thousand strong army, which proved successful, having repelled French and Spanish forces, but unfortunately could not drive back the heavily entrenched Prussians. With a stalemate developing and the tolls of war mounting up, peace was signed in October of 1748, where the European powers formally recognized Marie Theresa's legitimacy as Holy Roman Empress. But, at the expense of valuable land granted to both Prussia in terms of Silesia and Spain concerning the Italian region Parma (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2018).

Taking everything into account, the bargaining model does line up with the origins of this conflict across all three possibilities for war. The title, prestige, and privileges associated with the throne of the Holy Roman Empire are all endowed to only one royal elite, so the indivisibility issue is apparent as Marie Theresa could not share the status of empress with pretenders. Nor did she want side payments or concessions of any kind as compensation for relinquishing her rightful claim to the throne. Additionally, the Prussians were in a prime position to surprise attack Silesia as the majority of Austrian troops were stationed in Hungary and Italy to defend against Ottoman or Spanish incursions, respectively. This circumstance perfectly applies to the commitment problem rationale for war as Prussia and her allies had an apt incentive to strike first, considering their initial push would be relatively unopposed. Not to mention, the Prussian army had just recently undergone modernization, giving their infantry a massive advantage against every other European army at the time. With this private information in mind, coupled with the fact that Austria's armed forces were half strength after losing their last war, Frederick the Great (the leader of Prussia during this time) optimistically overestimated his forces and was further compelled to wage war.

Despite the accuracy Fearon's theory has, in terms of his ultimate three explanations for conflict, when applied to the War of Austrian Succession, the assumptions behind the bargaining model do not hold up in the same way. Frederick the Great's kingdom was not acting unitarily before or during the war with Austria. In fact, the conflict was against the advice of every single military and diplomatic aide in Frederick's court, so his state was definitely not united in his aggression towards Austria. Marie Theresa's empire was experiencing opposition as well, as her Bohemian subjects in the north were backing rival pretenders to hold control of the Holy Roman Empire. The actions of Prussia's coalition force against Austria would also illustrate that the states involved did not continuously perform risk-averse, rational decisions, as the bargaining model would suggest. For example, Prussia's coalition had dreaded the possibility that Russia would come to aid Marie Theresa, so they had convinced Sweden to start a war front in Finland, which ended disastrously for the Swedes and proved ineffective at neutralizing Russia. Another instance of carelessness would be the failed naval invasion attempt by France on Great Britain, who had been supplying Austria with troops and munitions. The entire fleet was destroyed at sea by storms before any battle could even commence, but the royal navy had maintained a blockade around French ports for years now, so supplies would not have been replenished to any troops that did successfully land. Lastly, to assume Frederick's state would not prefer war for its own sake is misleading and disingenuous as the Prussian king had personal grievances with the Austrians. Frederick was imprisoned at the hands of his own father due to Austrian meddling, forced to watch the execution of his good childhood friend for escaping, and was arranged a marriage with an Austrian approved bride after being stripped away of his previous love. The succession crisis within his long-despised rival gave him an ample opportunity to reap revenge for intimating his late father and inflicting personal grief upon him (Anderson 2019).

Conclusively, due to the bargaining model's ignorance of individual leaders as factors for conflict altogether and unrealistic premises, it simply cannot give a complete origin story to the War of Austrian Succession or any other war for that matter. Fearon's line of reasoning finishes with three accurate explanations for war, but unfortunately builds those upon pretenses no state would ever really possess. Governments are complicated mechanisms with numerous, distinct individuals holding differing beliefs and mindsets, even in the most autocratic of nations, so it is genuinely impossible to assume states experience no disputes internally. Leaders do not make the most competent decisions consistently either, as all humans have pre-existing biases that will negatively influence one's action when presented with new, contrary information known as premature cognitive closure. Fearon's theory implies that individuals rationally update their biases when presented with conflicting information, but humans have the cognitive need to simplify complexity, so the pre-existing thought prevails. Leaders also have deep-seated emotions that could compel them to declare war on a state due to nothing more than animosity, resentment, or a personal need for revenge. Yet again, the bargaining model is wrong in its assumption to believe war could not happen for violence's sake.

Instead, by including the assessment of individual leaders' thought processes and life experiences, the whole picture behind the causes of the War of Austrian Succession would be achieved. Afterall, this conflict was directed towards Marie Theresa specifically and sought out the overthrow of her empress title due to European society being extremely patriarchal. The other leaders of Europe opposing Austria found Marie Theresa's leadership of the Holy Roman Empire to be unacceptable, so war was inevitable as a result. The fact of the matter is that to avoid analyzing individual humans, as a factor for conflict, is frankly illogical as wars encompass states and states encompass people.